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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT        COUNTY OF ST. LAWRENCE
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X
In the Matter of the Application of
ROBERTO COTTO,#91-A-6350,
                           Petitioner,
for Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 DECISION, ORDER AND
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules JUDGMENT
RJI #44-1-2013-0663.40
INDEX #142021
           -against-                                             ORI # NY044015J              
TINA M. STANFORD, Chairwoman,
NYS Board of Parole,
      Respondent.      
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X
This is a proceeding for judgment pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR that was
originated by the Petition of Roberto Cotto, verified on September 2, 2013 and filed in the
St. Lawrence County Clerk’s office on September 13, 2013.   Petitioner, who is an inmate
at the Riverview Correctional Facility, is challenging the March 2013 determination
denying him parole and directing that he be held for an additional 24 months.   The Court1
issued an Order to Show Cause on September 24, 2013 and received and reviewed
respondent’s Notice of Motion to Dismiss, supported by the Affirmation of Alicia M.
Lendon, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, dated November 8, 2013.  The Court also
received and reviewed petitioner’s Affidavit in Opposition Motion to Dismiss, dated
November 29, 2013 and filed in the St. Lawrence County Clerk’s office on December 3,
2013.  In addition, the Court received and reviewed petitioner’s Notice of Motion for
 Although the March 2013 parole denial determination included a 24-month hold, such1
determination followed a de novo parole release interview replacing a December 2011 parole denial
determination that was reversed by Decision and Judgment of this Court dated January 22, 2013 under
Index No. 139796.  Accordingly, the 24-month hold dates back to December 0f 2011 and petitioner was
scheduled to re-appear before a Parole Board for discretionary release consideration in December of 2013. 
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Leave to Amend Petition, supported by his Affidavit, dated January 6, 2014.  In response
thereto the Court received the Affirmation in Opposition To Motion For Leave To Amend
the Petition of Alicia M. Lendon, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, dated January 24,
2014.
By Decision and Order dated March 19, 2014 respondent’s motion to dismiss was
denied.  In addition, the Court found petitioner’s motion for leave to amend his petition
unnecessary since the time for him to amend a pleading without leave of court under the
provisions of CPLR §3025(a) had not yet passed.  The Court further noted in its Decision
and Order of March 19, 2014 that counsel for the respondent had already received a copy
of the Amended Petition of Roberto Cotto, verified on January 4, 2014, since it had been
attached to petitioner’s motion papers.  Accordingly, respondent was directed to serve
answering papers with respect to the Amended Petition.
The Court has since received and reviewed respondent’s Notice of Motion to
Dismiss, supported by the Affirmation of Alicia M. Lendon, Esq., Assistant Attorney
General, dated April 4, 2014.  The Court has also received and reviewed petitioner’s
Affidavit in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, sworn to on April 15, 2014 and filed in the
St. Lawrence County Clerk’s office on April 17, 2014.
On July 1, 1991 petitioner was sentenced in Supreme Court, New York County, as
a second violent felony offender, to an indeterminate sentence of 3 to 6 years upon his
conviction of the crime of Criminal Possession of a Weapon 3°.  On June 19, 1992
petitioner was sentenced in the same court to a controlling indeterminate sentence of 17
years to life upon his convictions of the crimes of Murder 2°, Criminal Possession of a
Weapon 2°, Robbery 1°, Attempted Murder 2° and Assault 2°.  
After having been denied discretionary parole release on one prior occasion,
petitioner  made his second appearance before a Parole Board on December 13, 2011. 
2 of 7
[* 2]
Following that appearance a decision was rendered denying him discretionary release and
directing that he be held for an additional 24 months.  The December 2011 parole denial
determination reads as follows:
“PAROLE IS DENIED FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: AFTER A
CAREFUL REVIEW OF YOUR RECORD AND THIS INTERVIEW, IT IS
THE DETERMINATION OF THIS PANEL THAT IF RELEASED AT THIS
TIME THERE IS A REASONABLE PROBABILITY THAT YOU WOULD
NOT LIVE AND REMAIN AT LIBERTY W/O VIOLATING THE LAW AND
YOUR RELEASE AT THIS TIME IS INCOMPATIBLE W/THE WELFARE
AND SAFETY OF THE COMMUNITY. THIS DECISION IS BASED ON THE
FOLLOWING FACTORS: THE SERIOUS, BRUTAL NATURE OF THE I.O.
OF CPW 3 , MURDER 2 , CPW 2 , ROBBERY 1 , ATT. MURDER 2RD ND ND ST ND
AND ASSAULT 2  INVOLVED YOU ACTING IN CONCERTND
UNLAWFULLY ENTERING THE VICTIMS RESIDENCE TO STEAL
PROPERTY ONE VICTIM WAS SHOT AND SUSTAINED SERIOUS
PHYSICAL INJURY, A 2   VICTIM WAS SHOT AND KILLED.  DURINGnd
INTERVIEW YOU LACK [sic] INSIGHT AND REMORSE FOR YOUR
ACTIONS.  THI[S] IS A CONTINUATION OF YOUR CRIMINAL HISTORY
WITH A PROPENSITY FOR EXTREME VIOLENCE. YOUR ACTIONS
CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED A CALLOUS DISREGARD FOR THE
SANCTITY OF HUMAN LIFE.  NOTE IS ALSO MADE OF YOUR POSITIVE
PROGRAMING AND DISCIPLINARY RECORD. HOWEVER,
DISCRETIONARY RELEASE IS INAPPROPRIATE AT THIS TIME FOR
THE PANEL TO HOLD OTHERWISE WOULD SO DEPRECATE THE
SEVERITY OF THE OFFENSES AS TO UNDERMINE RESPECT FOR THE
LAW.”
The document perfecting petitioner’s administrative appeal from the December
2011 parole denial determination was received by the DOCCS Parole Appeals Unit on
April 30, 2012.  Although the Appeals Unit failed to issue its findings and
recommendation within the four-month time frame set forth in 9 NYCRR §8006.4(c), a
belated decision on administrative appeal was, in fact, issued on or about October 11,
2012.  
On September 11, 2012 petitioner commenced a proceeding in this Court under
Index No. 139796 challenging the December 2011 parole denial determination.  Among
the various arguments advanced in the proceeding under Index No. 139796, petitioner,
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citing the amended version of Executive Law §259-c(4) , asserted that parole authorities2
failed to establish and/or implement “ . . . written procedures . . . [incorporating] risk and
needs principals to measure the rehabilitation of persons appearing before the board, the
likelihood of success of such persons upon release, and assist members of the state board
of parole in determining which inmates may be released to parole supervision . . .”   The
respondent’s answering papers failed to address the Executive Law §259-c(4) issue and
this Court, by Decision and Judgment dated January 22, 2013,  therefore found “ . . . that
the December 2011 parole denial determination was not rendered in accordance with law
and must be overturned, with the matter remitted to the Board of Parole for de novo
discretionary parole release consideration.”  (Citations omitted).
In response to the Court’s Decision and Judgment of January 22, 2013 (Index No.
139796) petitioner re-appeared before a Parole Board on March 6, 2013 for de novo
release consideration.  Following that re-appearance a decision was issued denying
petitioner discretionary release and directing that he be held for an additional 24 months,
with his next appearance scheduled for December of 2013 (see footnote #1 of this Decision
and Judgment).  The March 2013 parole denial determination reads as follows:
“PAROLE IS DENIED.  AFTER PERSONAL INTERVIEW, RECORD
REVIEW AND DELIBERATION, IT IS THE DETERMINATION OF THIS
PANEL THAT, IF RELEASED AT THIS TIME, THERE IS A REASONABLE
PROBABILITY THAT YOU WOULD NOT LIVE AT LIBERTY W/O
VIOLATING THE LAW, YOUR RELEASE IS INCOMPATIBLE W/ THE
 Executive Law §259-c(4), as amended by L 2011, ch 62, part C, subpart A, §38-b, effective2
September 30, 2011, provides that the New York State Board of Parole shall “ . . . establish written
procedures for its use in making parole decisions as required by law.  Such written procedures shall
incorporate risk and needs principles to measure the rehabilitation of persons appearing before the board,
the likelihood of success of such persons upon release, and assist members of the state board of parole in
determining which inmates may be released to parole supervision . . .”  (Emphasis added).  Prior to the
amendment Executive Law §259-c(4) provided, in relevant part, that the New York State Board of Parole
shall “ . . . establish written guidelines for its use in making parole decisions as required by law . . . Such
written guidelines may consider the use of a risks and needs assessment instrument to assist members of




WELFARE AND SAFETY OF THE COMMUNITY.  YOUR CRIMINAL
RECORD REFLECTS PRIOR UNLAWFUL BEHAVIOR, WHICH IS A
CONCERN FOR THIS PANEL.  CONSIDERATION HAS BEEN GIVEN TO
AN ASSESSMENT OF YOUR RISKS AND NEEDS FOR SUCCESS ON
PAROLE.  THIS PANEL ALSO NOTES YOUR PROGRAMING AND
RELEASE PLANS.  ALSO, IT IS NOTED THAT YOU HAVE INCURRED
INFRACTIONS FOR MISBEHAVIOR.  WHEN CONSIDERING ALL
RELEVANT FACTORS, DISCRETIONARY RELEASE IS NOT
WARRANTED.  YOUR RELEASE WOULD SO DEPRECATE THE
SERIOUS NATURE OF YOUR CRIME AS TO UNDERMINE RESPECT
FOR THE LAW.  YOU DEMONSTRATED A TOTAL DISREGARD FOR
THE RULES OF SOCIETY AND THE VALUE OF HUMAN LIFE.  THIS
DECISION IS A DE NOVO HEARING REPLACING THE 12-13-2011
INTERVIEW.”
This proceeding (Index No. 142021) ensued. 
Two causes of action are set forth in the Amended Petition, as follows:
“This [Amended] Petition claims that Respondent, Tina M. Stanford and
her agency [New York State Board of Parole] failed (1) to adopt lawful new
written procedures, pursuant to the amended version of Executive Law
§259-c(4), which shall govern members of the Parole Board on how a parole
release decision should be made and (2) to develop and utilize the
Transitional Accountability Plan (‘TAP’) component of this risk and needs
assessment instrument, as one of the statutory factors that must be
incorporated into the decision-making process, as required by law pursuant
to Executive Law §259-c(4) and Correction Law §71-a, for consideration by
the members of the Parole Board.”  
Respondent’s current motion to dismiss is premised upon the assertion that on
March 5, 2014 (adjourned from December of 2013) petitioner again re-appeared before
a Parole Board and was again denied discretionary release.  According to respondent, such
reappearance/parole denial rendered petitioner’s instant challenge to the March 2013
parole denial determination moot.  Although a reappearance and denial would ordinarily
render a challenge to a prior parole denial determination moot, this Court finds that
petitioner’s argument with respect to the Parole Board’s alleged failure to comply with the
amended version of Executive Law §259-c(4) represents a substantial issue that continues
to evade review.  Accordingly, this Court finds that an exception to the mootness doctrine
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is presented.  See Standley v. New York State Division of Parole, 34 AD3d 1169.  Since
respondent’s motion papers go on to address both causes of action set forth in the
Amended Petition, on the merits, the Court finds no reason to extend the duration of this
proceeding by directing the submission of additional answering papers.
With respect to the amended verison of Executive Law §259-c(4), respondent,
citing Montane v. Evans, 116 AD3d 197, lv granted __ NY3d __, 2014 NY Slip Op 71974,
asserts that a certain “ . . . October 5, 2011 Memorandum by then Parole Board
Chairwoman Andrea Evans sufficiently establishes the requisite procedures for
incorporating risk and needs principles, and satisfies the Parole Board’s [amended
statutory] obligation . . .”  This Court agrees.  See Partee v. Evans, __AD3d __, 2014 NY
Slip Op 03567, aff’g 40 Misc 3d 896.  
Turning to petitioner’s second cause of action, the Court notes that as part of the
same legislative enactment (L 2011, ch 62, part C, subpart A) wherein Executive Law §
259-c(4) was amended, a new Correction Law § 71-a was added, as follows:
“Upon admission of an inmate committed to the custody of the department
[DOCCS] under an indeterminate or determinate sentence of
imprisonment, the department shall develop a transitional accountability
plan.  Such plan shall be a comprehensive, dynamic and individualized case
management plan based on the programming and treatment needs of the
inmate.  The purpose of such plan shall be to promote the rehabilitation of
the inmate and their successful and productive reentry and reintegration
into society upon release.  To that end, such plan shall be used to prioritize
programming and treatment services for the inmate during incarceration
and any period of community supervision.”
Although Correction Law §71-a became effective on September 30, 2011, the Court finds
nothing in the legislative enactment to suggest that it mandates the preparation of a
Transitional Accountability Plan (TAP) with respect to an inmate - like petitioner - already
in DOCCS custody prior to the effective date of the statute.  To the extent the petitioner
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relies on the decision of the Appellate Division, Third Department in Garfield v. Evans,
108 AD3d 830, the Court finds such reliance to be misplaced.  Although the Garfield court
overturned an October 2011 parole denial determination based upon the Parole Board’s
failure to utilize a COMPAS Risk and Needs Assessment instrument in conjunction with
a board appearance that took place after the effective date of the amendment to Executive
Law §259-c(4), there is nothing in Garfield to suggest that any failure on the part of the
Parole Board to utilize a TAP was alleged or considered by the court.  As noted in
paragraph 14 of Assistant Attorney General Lendon’s April 4, 2014 Affirmation in support
of Motion to Dismiss, moreover, the October 5, 2011 Memorandum of former Parole
Board Chairwoman Evans “ . . . only mention[s] consideration of a TAP if it had replaced
the Inmate Status Report for a given inmate, which it indisputedly did not in Petitioner’s
case at the time of the [March 6 , 2013] hearing.” (Emphasis in original).  There is noth
doubt that a COMPAS Risk and Needs Assessment instrument was utilized in conjunction
with petitioner’s March 6, 2013 Parole Board appearance and the ensuing discretionary
parole denial determination. 
Based upon all of the above, it is, therefore, the decision of the Court and it is
hereby
ORDERED, that respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition as moot is denied;
and it is further
ADJUDGED, that the petition is dismissed on the merits. 
Dated: May 27, 2014 at
Indian Lake, New York ___________________________
S. Peter Feldstein
Acting Justice, Supreme Court
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